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Given that around 20 percent of the members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are 
identified as least developed countries (LDC's), global trade negotiations, resumed after the 
Cancun fiasco of September 2003, must address some major development issues in the spirit 
of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), if they are to make any headway. This will, 
predictably, involve some sensible give-and-take not only between the developed countries 
and the LDC's, but also amongst the LDC's themselves, and between them and other 
developing countries. Issues of restrictions affecting agricultural trade - a major factor in the 
failure at Cancun - need re-addressing; but non-agricultural trade issues must also feature in 
the negotiations as that could make some acceptable policy compromises possible. This paper 
investigates, in a computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) framework, the welfare impacts on 
selected developed and developing country groupings of several scenarios of trade 
liberalisation that are likely to enhance agricultural and non-agricultural trade flows within the 
LDC's, and between them and other developing countries. The scenarios will involve 
experimentation with selected commodities that are of special export interest to LDC's to 
identify some modalities of trade liberalisation and policy reciprocity, that are more likely to 
be acceptable to all parties. 
                                                 
1    Paper prepared for presentation at the Ninth International Convention of the East Asian Economic 
Association in Hong Kong, November 13-14, 2004. 
2   Enquiries about the paper may be addressed to this author whose e-mail address is s.shakur@massey.ac.nz. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After intense negotiations- almost down-to-the-wire haggling, the World Trade Organization's 
(WTO) 147 member governments approved on 31 July 2004, an accord on the framework of 
future WTO negotiations.  This latest accord brings the Doha Round talks back on track after 
a bitter collapse in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico.  The accord also brings new, albeit 
cautious, optimism towards successful completion of DDA when trade ministers meet for the 
Sixth conference in December 2005, in Hong Kong. 
 
It is helpful to remember that the need to address the issue of agricultural protectionism has 
long been acknowledged by the WTO as well as by its rich and poor members.  Indeed, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) provided a mutually accepted framework 
to dismantle gradually the existing barriers that affect agricultural trade.  Commitments to 
reduce agricultural protection relates to three major policy areas, sometimes referred to in the 
WTO circles as the "three pillars", viz. domestic support, export competition and market 
access.  There is, in addition, the recognition that the poorest of the developing countries need 
special treatment that would ensure that they receive more generous trade concessions and, 
where possible, without having to reciprocate, as the WTO rules normally require.   
 
The launch of the Doha Round in November 2001 witnessed two overtures on the part of the 
developed countries to inspire confidence amongst the poor countries that their concerns were 
not being ignored.  These were the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the European 
Union, and the explicit undertaking to re-examine the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-
related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) issues affecting the developing countries.  The Doha 
declaration also contained a formal waiver for preferential schemes such as the Cotonou 
Agreement.  Closer to the Cancun meeting, fresh unease amongst the poor countries surfaced 
in several areas such as the cotton subsidy used by many developed, and some developing, 
countries to the serious detriment of several poor countries, particularly, but not exclusively, 
in West Africa.  
 
The issue of manufacturing trade protectionism is also one that is resented by both the 
developed and developing countries.  The developed countries with a much longer history as 
"industrial economies" have always argued - often with some justification - that the 
developing countries, in an effort to diversify their economies away from primary production, 
have long used many and varied instruments to restrict trade, to the detriment of the 
developed economies.  Indeed, the degree of protection on industrial products has remained 
persistently higher in the developing countries.  For their part, the developing countries point 
to the unfairness of the system that kept textile and clothing, a labour-intensive major, item of 
trade of many developing countries outside the GATT altogether.  Other labour-intensive 
products like leather and footwear, likewise, faced severe restrictions in world trade.  
 
One of the more significant decisions for the developing countries to emerge out of the 
Uruguay Round was to end the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) that operated outside the 
GATT to control trade in textile products, and include textiles and clothing within the WTO 
process by 2005.  Ironically, while this decision is generally considered to be a welcome 
development, it has helped to divide the larger developing countries from the smaller ones.  
1 The smaller developing countries see this concession as a reciprocal gesture made by the 
developed countries to secure similar concessions from the larger developing countries in 
other areas of trade.  As the smaller developing countries cannot offer concessions that are 
attractive enough to the other countries - developed and larger developing - they are left out of 
these concessions.  These perceptions, right or wrong, underline the delicate nature of the 
issues in the trade policy area.  They also highlight the importance of pragmatism over 
expectations of "fairness" in trade policy negotiations.  When parties around the negotiating 
table are prepared to compromise on what they may consider to be an "ideal" or a "fair" 
policy stance from their own national point of view, the chances of achieving success, if only 
second best ones, probably improve. 
 
It is in this spirit that this paper attempts to model scenarios of trade liberalisation involving 
agricultural and non-agricultural trade to assess their welfare implications for selected 
countries and country groupings.  The paper acknowledges the declared developmental goals 
of the Doha round as pivotal to not only improving the prospects of eventual success in the 
negotiations, but also to start redressing some of the stark realities of poverty, malnutrition, ill 
health and lack of life opportunities in many developing countries, especially in the least 
developed countries.  As Uri Dadush, director of the World Bank's Economic Policy and 
Prospects Group observes "a round that brings down barriers in agriculture, advances the 
timetable on textiles, and agrees to curtail antidumping at the same time it takes up the 
concerns of industrialised countries has the potential for being a true Development Round" 
(World Bank 2002).  In this paper we cover these issues, and quantify the gains and losses - 
and their sources - by simulating in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
framework alternative liberalisation scenarios.  We include liberalisation of the cotton sector 
as part of the agricultural reform generally; we examine liberalisation of textile, apparel and 
leather, as well as manufactures more generally.  We simulate reductions in tariff, export 
subsidy and domestic support for agriculture, and compare their impact on the welfare levels 
of the selected parties.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 starts with a stage-setting discussion on the 
current state of multilateral trade negotiations.  Achievements in trade policy areas since the 
end of the Uruguay Round, especially in respect of trade involving agriculture and textile, 
apparel and leather, are summarised along with the remaining obstacles that trade negotiators 
would have to overcome for a successful completion of DDA.  Section 3 covers the relevant 
theoretical issues, and the issues of measurement of welfare changes and its sources, 
following the implementation of each modelled scenario. The modelling techniques are then 
introduced in section 4, with an elaboration of the commodities and regional aggregations 
selected. Section 5 reports and interprets the results from the trade liberalisation experiments. 
The concluding section brings together the major findings of these experiments with a 
discussion on their implications for policy in the Doha Round. 
2 2.  THE ROAD TO DOHA 
 
The Doha Round, successor to the UR, was launched at the fourth Ministerial conference in 
November 2001. After the disastrous failure of the earlier Seattle Ministerial conference in 
1999 and the anti-globalisation backlash that followed its demise, the Doha Round brought 
some relief and gave multilateral negotiations a fresh start. Key decisions were agreed on 
continued negotiations to further liberalise agricultural trade (beyond those achieved during 
UR), reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to industrial trade, offer special and differential 
treatment to developing countries including duty-free and quota-free access to goods 
originating in least-developed countries
3.
  The World Bank (2002) estimates potential annual 
gain of $2.8 trillion from the elimination of trade barriers and trade-related reforms on all 
goods and services by 2015. Presumably, this is what the Doha Round would like to achieve 
in the ten years to 2015. Further, the World Bank estimates put potential developing country 
gains to the tune of $1.5 trillion that would, potentially, lift 320 million people out of poverty. 
In regard to the split of the gains from liberalising industrial and agricultural sectors, the Bank 
estimates two-thirds of the gain from cutting tariffs on industrial goods (about $300 billion) 
would go to developing countries, and they would gain a roughly equivalent amount from the 
abolition of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in the OECD. Specific reforms would need 
to be agreed in various sectors and regions to achieve these results. 
 
 
2.1  From Uruguay to Doha- Areas of extended reforms 
 
(a)   Agriculture 
 
The Doha ministerial declaration (WTO 2001a, para. 13) states that "without prejudging 
the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations 
aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to 
phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support."  
 
The URAA and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement laid the foundation of 
an ambitious goal of liberalising global agricultural trade and bring it in line with trade 
in industrial products. The URAA 'tarrified' many distortions by converting NTBs into 
tariffs equal to the difference between internal and external prices existing during 1986-
88. All tariffs were bound and cut by a minimum of 15 percent and an average reduction 
equal to 36 percent, for developed countries. However, often these bindings are set at 
very high rates compared to those that are actually applied. Many of the high-protection 
countries pursued a process of 'dirty-tariffication', which led to higher levels of 
protection than existed at the time of the Uruguay Agreement. As the new millennium 
folded, agricultural tariffs remained far above their industrial counterpart. Gibson et al 
(2001) estimated post UR global bound tariffs for agricultural products at 62%. 
 
                                                 
3   The Doha round also agreed on important decisions on clarifying and improving WTO rules on anti dumping 
procedures, investment and competition rules- the so called “Singapore issues” and dispute settlements. 
However, these areas are not researched in this paper. 
3 (b)   Industrials 
 
Since the inception of the GATT in 1947, completion of eight trade rounds have reduced 
developed country average tariffs on industrial goods to levels from which further 
reductions can only be modest. In the post UR situation, problems remained in areas of 
tariff dispersion and high bound tariffs. A survey (WTO 2001b) of 42 developed and 
developing countries found the average level of bound tariffs for industrial products 
ranged from 1.8% to 59%. The same study found differences between the average 
bound and average applied tariff rates reaching more than 30% in some countries. The 
developing country interests in reducing trade barriers in industrial products were 
mixed. Hertel and Martin (2000 p.468) notes manufactured exports account for about 
three-quarters of total merchandise exports for the average developing country. The 
average tariff imposed by high-income countries on manufactured imports from 
developing countries are, on average, four time as high as those imposed on 
manufactured imports from other high-income countries (Hertel and Martin 2000, 
p.464). At the same time the developing countries through their high and differentiated 
tariffs, themselves share the blame of restricting trade in industrial products. The focus 
at this point turned on developed country peak tariffs and tariff escalations that restrict 
developing country exports in textile and apparel, processed food, leather goods and 
footwear.  
 
The Doha Declaration launched negotiations on a new round of reductions in tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on industrial goods, under the term "market access for non-
agricultural products."  The main interest of developing countries is that developed 
countries bring down their tariff peaks and tariff escalation on products, especially on 
apparel, textile, and processed food. Our trade liberalisation experiments reflect these 
interests. 
 
(c)   Special and differential treatment of developing countries 
 
In the past, GATT's most-favoured nation (MFN) obligation meant developing countries 
were free riders in that they did not have to reciprocate by opening their own markets to 
foreign competition. The apparent concession to developing countries also meant their 
non-participation in seven out of eight trade rounds under the auspices of the old GATT. 
The developing countries were deprived of improved access to industrial country 
markets for the competitive but lucrative agricultural and apparel exports. The Uruguay 
Round should be commended for bringing together 115 countries, a majority of these 
representing developing states, for the first time in a major reciprocity agreement.  
 
One cornerstone of the Doha Development Agenda is the provision of special and 
differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries.  The Doha Ministerial declaration 
states "…the contribution of developing countries to market access reduction 
commitments in the non-agricultural market access and agriculture negotiations should 
take account of their levels of development in particular sectors, as well as their food 
security, rural development and livelihood concerns.."  
4 2.2  From Doha to Cancun- Why did the Cancun meeting fail? 
 
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 broke 
up amid acrimony and disagreements between the rich and the poor countries on several 
issues of which agricultural trade policies practised by the rich countries was, arguably, the 
most prominent. However, there were many other reasons as discussed below. 
 
First, multilateral trade negotiations in recent times have become more complex. The WTO 
now has 147 member countries. Gone are the days of the GATT era when the US and 
European Community were the main hegemonic powers. The developing countries realise 
they have huge stake in securing trade concessions from industrial countries. They are now as 
much part of intense coalitional politics as their developed counterparts adding to the 
complexity of WTO deliberations. This was clearly observed in Cancun.  
 
Second, some "visible" members failed to achieve a negotiated balance of concessions - a 
give and take approach to bargaining.  The US, EU and Japan were unwilling to commit 
substantial changes to their current policies of protecting agriculture and in some 
manufacturing sectors. Having failed to meet an earlier deadline to agree on modalities for 
farm trade talks, a US-EU proposal was hastily tabled in late August 2003.  The developing 
countries read very little in the proposal beyond how each country's subsidies were classified 
under the green, blue, and amber boxes of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. An alliance of 
developing countries led by China, India, Brazil and South Africa that came to be known as 
the G-20 was formed at this point mainly to resist the US-EU proposal - thereby further 
polarising the conflict. The EU and Japan were seemingly keen on negotiations on the 
Singapore issues, probably for tactical reasons - to avoid decision points on agriculture. The 
middle income developing countries objected to lowering their own trade barriers which were 
already much higher than developed countries, without increased access to these latter 
markets. As Bhagwati (2004) observed, developed countries insist on a level playing field 
before they agree to abandon their insistence on trade protection and production subsidies. 
Lack of reciprocity sealed the destiny of the Cancun meeting.  
 
Third, many developing countries were keen to preserve the value of their regional 
preferences especially from the US, EU and other former colonial masters. Fearful of WTO 
reform proposals that would erode their "margins of preference" in industrial markets, some 
of these developing countries threatened to delay or block these proposals in Cancun. As a 
result of all these, trade negotiations stalled at Cancun, putting the Doha Round in serious 
jeopardy. 
 
2.3  Current state of negotiations 
 
The Doha Round provided the much needed psychological boost to free traders, but three 
years since its formal launch, very little tangible result has been achieved. Significant and 
contentious trade barriers remain to make it impossible to conclude DDA within the stipulated 
deadline of 1 January 2005. The WTO did manage to achieve a Framework Agreement 
amongst its 147 members in Geneva on 31 July 2004 to restart the stalled negotiation process. 
It seemingly provides a structure that needs to be implemented for furthering the Doha 
5 Development Agenda (DDA) so that one can be cautiously optimistic about its successful 
conclusion not too long after the deadline. Contentious issues remain to the individual 
elements that need to be resolved and we focus on these below: 
 
(a)   Market Access 
 
Following on from the UR, the Doha declaration vowed to continue an accelerated 
negotiation to liberalise agriculture and start new negotiations to further reduce tariff 
and NTBs to trade industrial products. Unfortunately, at this point we find direct border 
barriers in both developed and developing countries remain stubbornly high, threatening 
market access commitments made by WTO member states. Low average tariffs in 
OECD countries camouflage the fact that tariffs remain unacceptably high in agriculture 
and textiles and clothing. These sectors also represent major export potential for lesser 
developed countries. Anderson (2000) states that the levels of protection applied by 
developed countries in these two sectors are more than ten times the average protection 
applied on other (industrial) sectors.  
 
(b)   Agriculture as the stumbling block 
 
From the developing-country members' point of view, agricultural trade liberalisation is 
the single most important objective to pursue in multilateral trade negotiations. Some 
progress has been made in clearing up outstanding technical and procedural issues and 
many negotiating proposals have been put forward. But "agricultural protection in high 
income countries remain almost as high as it was at the end of the Uruguay Round, and 
serious distortions continue to plague agriculture in developing countries"   
(Sally 2003 p. 15). 
 
In regard to agriculture, the most significant outcome of the July 2004 framework 
accord is a historic commitment to eliminate all export subsidies and export credit 
guarantees at a date yet to be set. Other agreements reached in the accord are to reduce 
the cap on trade-distorting subsidy payments by 20 percent in the first year of the 
agreement, remove trade-distorting practices in food aid and state-run export boards, 
and use an unspecified formula to lower tariff barriers (including cutting the highest 
tariffs by the largest amount)
4. Accordingly, our liberalisation experiments calculate the 
relocation and welfare effects of eliminating export subsidies, reducing trade-distorting 
supports and tariff barriers.   
 
(c)   Cotton 
 
As a crop cotton is often held up as a prime example of how rich nation subsidies shut 
out the poor. "The General Council recognizes the importance of cotton for a certain 
number of countries and its vital importance for developing countries, especially LDCs. 
The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture shall ensure appropriate 
prioritization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral initiatives. ….Work 
                                                 
4   We note, however, that paragraph 13 in the July 2004 Accord relating to “blue box” definition appears to 
permit inclusion of new support programmes introduced in the 2002 US Farm Bill.  
6 shall encompass all trade distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of 
market access, domestic support, and export competition, as specified in the Doha text 
and this Framework text." (Doha Work Programme, Draft General Council Decision of 
July 2004, WT/GC/W/5351, 31 July 2004) 
 
(d)   Industrials 
 
Like agriculture, proposals for industrial trade reforms have been numerous. To date, the 
U.S. has brought the most ambitious proposal to the Doha Round. US National Foreign 
Trade Council has 2015 as the target date for scrapping all industrial tariffs, with 2010 
as the intermediate target date for eliminating all tariffs under five percent, and bringing 
maximum tariffs down to eight percent. The proposal is supported by New Zealand, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore while the EU and Japan remain ambivalent. The real 
opposition, however, comes from most developing countries, especially the least 
developed ones. Unique to these developing countries is the dependence of their 
governments on customs duties as a source of revenue. A narrow tax base on which to 
impose direct taxes mean a tariff removal proposal will be met with less enthusiasm. 
This is unfortunate as these poorer countries stand to reap maximum benefit from tariff 
reduction. The potential of triple benefits would accrue from (i) efficiency gains in 
opening their own markets to imports, (ii) the opening of other developing-country 
markets to their exports, and, (iii) the opening of developed-country markets to their 
exports, particularly in textiles, apparel and footwear. The July 2004 accord also 
includes some issues related to industrial products that are not yet agreed on and will be 
discussed in future talks; that is, cutting import tariffs below a maximum ceiling based 
on an unspecified formula and bringing some tariffs to a fixed level or eliminating them. 
 
In terms of UR Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC),  It is fair to say that so far 
not much has been done, and the phase-out of quotas has been back-loaded to the last 
year. The fear is that high tariffs and a cascade of antidumping actions will follow in 
2005 and beyond. The fear is now amplified by China's entry to the WTO since 2001. 
There is a good chance that the new round will suffer a further serious setback if 
developed countries do not live up to their ATC commitments by the 2005 deadline 
(Sally 2003, p.17). 
 
(e)   Developing and Least-Developed Countries 
 
The text of the July 2004 framework accord makes clear that the Least-Developed 
Countries, which will have full access to all special and differential treatment provisions 
as stated in section 2.2, are not required to undertake reduction commitments.  "The 
specific concerns of preference dependent, commodity dependent countries and net 
food-importing developing countries shall be appropriately addressed, in the context of 
multilateral liberalization commitments undertaken in the Doha Round" (Doha Work 
Programme, Draft General Council Decision of July 2004, WT/GC/W/5351, 31 July 
2004). Further, developed members, and developing country members, in a position to 
do so, should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating 
from least-developed countries.  
7 Non-reciprocity as implied in special and differential treatment must be approached with 
caution. Standard trade theory literature suggests that the bulk of the gains from trade 
come from unilateral trade liberalisation. The give-and-take approach in which trade 
negotiators haggle over export concessions in return for import access to their own 
markets do not have as much economic merit when considered against unilateral trade 
liberalisation. It is no surprise that the results of our experiments support this point. The 
LDC welfare gains turn out to be either small, or even negative under this differential 
arrangement. However, the reality of domestic politics suggests such unilateral 
liberalisation is prone to be challenged by powerful protectionist interests at home. 
Multilateral negotiations with firm commitments from trading partners can help 
mobilise support of domestic exporters to overcome such protectionist interests, lending 
support for a multilateral approach. Rights to market access for exports and guarantees 
against arbitrary protection by more powerful nations that embody WTO rules may 
provide inducement to smaller and lesser-developed countries to join the march towards 
global free trade (Krugman 1999). 
 
It should be pointed out that the special and differential treatment (SDT) contained in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration was meant for least-developed countries. Standard 
trade theory suggests all countries, irrespective of their level of economic development, 
should subscribe to the give-and-take (reciprocity) principle to extract maximum benefit 
from the WTO system. Non-reciprocity as contained in SDT can potentially cause more 
harm than good for the developing countries. The WTO's concern here is that the least-
developed countries have legitimate implementation issues to address, given the 
complexity of the Uruguay Round agreements and their limited capacity to give effect to 
them domestically. The middle-income and/or more advanced developing countries like 
India or Argentina does not have these problems of comparable magnitude to those of 
sub-Saharan Africa, for example.  Accordingly, we have categorised the member states 
as (i) developed, (ii) developing, and (iii) least developed economies in our experiments 
and allowed for SDT in line with the DDR declaration. 
 
 
3.   TRADE LIBERALISATION: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The economic rationale for removing trade barriers of all kinds should be the fact that a 
country benefits from opening its own markets regardless of what policies other countries 
choose to pursue.  The superiority of free trade over autarky or restricted trade, based on the 
comparative advantage of countries, is well entrenched in trade theory ever since David 
Ricardo’s classic demonstration of it. The only exceptions in the form of a country exploiting 
its monopoly or monopsony power in trade by imposing an optimum tariff, or temporarily 
protecting a domestic (infant) industry are based on a particular set of special conditions. And 
even then, their superiority over free trade in welfare terms is valid only for the country using 
them. For global efficiency and welfare maximisation, free trade is unexceptionable.  
 
8 In the past two decades, countries as diverse as Australia, New Zealand, Chile, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Hungary and Poland have decided unilaterally to abandon the 
old autarkic model of import substitution in favour of greater integration into the global 
economy. Albania, virtually a closed economy until the late 1980s, joined the WTO in 
September 2000. China, too, an emerging giant in the world economy and trade after its long 
economic isolation, negotiated long and hard, and finally gained entry into the WTO in 2001. 
The driving force for opening up domestic markets in these countries was not seen so much as 
a prospect of a quid pro quo by other prosperous nations, but the realization that 
protectionism was preventing the most efficient use of scarce resources, and thereby harming 
economic growth. The removal of tariff barriers affects both production and consumption, and 
the benefits are unambiguous, if done in a non-discriminatory fashion.  
 
Selective agreements that remove barriers amongst partners, but permit barriers against 
outsiders, however, have been more in evidence over the years. The theory of economic 
integration captures these effects in terms of trade creation and trade diversion that typically 
arise out of the formation of a preferential trading arrangement such as a customs union. 
Trade creation results when the removal of barriers within the union creates new trade 
opportunities for the most efficient partner. Trade diversion occurs when such intra-union 
tariff removal plus a common tariff against third countries divert trade away from a more 
efficient third country to a union partner. While the former has the potential to improve 
welfare of the union members through allocative efficiency gains and consumer surplus gains 
within the union, the latter reduces global welfare. The net effect on global welfare therefore 
will depend on the balance of the welfare gains and losses of trade creating and trade 
diverting consequences of selective tariff removals. Welfare gains and losses are measured in 
terms of gains and losses in real output of countries. It is an exercise in the theory of the 
second best as it is only universal free trade that offers the first-best Pareto optimality. This 
research examines several alternative scenarios for trade liberalisation, and computes their 
effects, ex ante, on the welfare levels of countries and country groups.  
 
By observing the relative prices of goods within the protected countries and their world prices 
– the difference being a measure of the tariff equivalence – one can capture the effect of the 
removal of a trade barrier. When a tariff (or some other trade barrier) is removed, the import 
of the good in question usually rises, and its price falls in the previously protecting country, 
while its output and price rise in the countries that are its more efficient producers. Resources 
will be removed from these sectors in the importing countries and reallocated to other, more 
efficient, uses, giving rise to allocative efficiency gains there. Similar efficiency gains in the 
exporting country will result from more resources being devoted to the freed-up sectors.  
 
The decline in the import price will lead to an increase in consumption, and a corresponding 
gain in consumer surplus in the importing country adding to the welfare improvement it 
experienced from allocative efficiency gains. The trade balance of the exporting countries will 
improve in respect of the freed-up sectors – another source of potential gains for them. 
 
9 However, the changes indicated above are only direct, ‘first-round’, changes. In any partial 
setting of tariff removals that are proposed from time to time, there often arise several flow-on 
effects. For example, any reduction of prices at the upstream end resulting from a selective 
approach to tariff removal may encourage using the cheaper imported inputs to produce more 
at the downstream end, and thereby reduce trade there. This kind of tariff escalation is quite 
common, and it usually has an adverse impact on global welfare levels.  
 
A further source of gain/loss is the expected change in the terms of trade resulting from the 
removal of barriers that increase the prices of some traded goods, and lower those of others. 
The empirical findings of the paper confirm the possibility of such changes. 
 
The exercise involving the measurement of welfare changes in terms of consumer surplus 
requires capturing the pure substitution effect, i.e. the substitution of imports for import 
substitutes prompted by the change in relative prices, while the consumers’ real income was 
held constant. The income effect of the price change is thus netted out. Typically, the 
assumption is made that the income effects are relatively unimportant (Corden 1975), and it is 
not necessary therefore to derive a compensated demand curve for estimating the welfare 
changes in terms of substitution effects alone. In common with a number of other studies in 
this area (Khan 1997, Martin 1997), this paper uses the equivalent variation to measure the 
changes in welfare. This Hicksian concept is embedded in the ordinal approach to the 
measurement of consumer surplus, and is closely related to the concept of compensating 
variation alluded to above. 
 
While all this is relatively straightforward, and based on sound theoretical insights, there are 
other issues in the area of trade liberalisation that are more complex, and need exploring in 
analytical terms first. One example of this complication concerns the removal of trade or 
domestic subsidies that have helped keep prices of some traded goods cheaper in the 
importing countries. Removal of these subsidies or stopping the practice of dumping products 
in selected export markets by major exporters will inevitably raise prices of the products 
concerned in the importing countries, and lower their welfare. Similarly, greater use of the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of extending trade liberalisation would require the 
removal of preferential access to markets. While this has the potential to improve allocative 
efficiency, it will also have adverse distributional consequences on those that currently enjoy 
preferential access.  
 
These issues have a theoretical dimension as outlined above. They also have several practical 
dimensions that need consideration in the context of promoting trade liberalisation by 
removing subsidies on traded products and/or stopping their dumping in selected markets. 
Subsidised imports from rich countries – or dumping by them – reduce domestic production 
of the products in question, and increase import dependence. If they involve food products, as 
they often do, they may increase food insecurity. In many cases, such subsidised trade and in 
some instances food aid, results from the need of the rich exporting countries to dispose of 
their surpluses of certain products. Once the surpluses are taken care of, the subsidies cease or 
food aid flows diminish, and the recipients face hardship. Trade based on comparative 
advantage, on the other hand, would promote efficiency in the long run by enforcing 
competition in the domestic market.  
10 However, the removal of subsidies and the practice of dumping will almost always pose a 
short run adjustment problem that will need to be dealt with, possibly through international 
financial transfers. The revenue savings derived from the removal of the subsidies could be 
used to set up a “development fund” to be made available to the affected countries to enable 
them to continue importing the products at (higher) market prices while their own producers 
respond to the challenge of a larger domestic market unfettered by artificially lower import 
prices. Estimates from the OECD and IMF do not foresee substantial price increases in the 
case of cereals, for example (IMF 2002). The need for assistance therefore is not likely to be 
large. In any case, the benefits of lower prices of imported staple foods do not often reach the 
poorest consumers living away from the urban centres of developing countries because of the 
transport costs within these countries, and/or the actions of importers’ and traders’ cartels 
formed to maximise the rents offered by the subsidies. 
 
Subsidised trade can also have major market disrupting effects in third countries. Rich 
countries seeking to offload surplus agricultural products in several developing countries can 
disrupt exports from one developing country to another by making them uncompetitive at 
prices that reflect their costs of production. South-South trade represents approximately one-
half of total trade of developing countries. In the absence of subsidies and dumping, such 
trade could offer more opportunities for producers to compete, develop new market outlets 
and derive greater economies of scale. This is likely to be the case with US subsidies on 
cotton, for example. In a similar vein, according to an FAO report (FAO 2002), very little of 
the benefits of export credits provided by the developed countries are aimed at net food 
importing countries. 
 
Thus, while this paper accepts that the removal of trade subsidies and dumping has the 
potential to harm the interest of the importing countries through increased prices, it considers 
such outcomes to be of a short-term nature. It also affirms, in the light of the discussion 
above, that the anticipated increase in the import prices may not be as high as the costs of 




4.   MODEL, DATA AND LIBERALISATION EXPERIMENTS 
 
4.1  The model and data 
 
We use the standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) applied general equilibrium 
model (Hertel 1997). This is a multi-region model built on a complete set of economic 
accounts and detailed inter-industry linkages for each of the economies represented. The 
GTAP production system distinguishes sectors by their intensities in five primary production 
factors: land (agricultural sectors only), natural resources (extractive sectors only), capital, 
and skilled and unskilled labour. Producers choose inputs that minimise production costs 
subject to separable, constant returns to scale technologies. Market clearing conditions equate 
supply with demand for each factor of production. In trade, products are differentiated by 
country of origin, allowing bilateral trade to be modelled, and bilateral international transport 
margins are incorporated and supplied by a global transport sector. The model is solved using 
GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 1996).  
11 The version 6 pre-release 3 GTAP database used here is benchmarked to 2001. Thus the 
commitments of the Uruguay Round should be fully reflected in this database, at least for 
developed countries. We aggregate this database from its full 86 regions by 57 sectors up to 
17 regions and 21 sectors. This aids computation and enables us to highlight sectors and 
regions of particular interest. As regards regions, our choices allow the definition of three 
regional groupings - developed, developing and the least developed (see Appendix Table 2). 
At the sectoral level, we define a number of farm and processed food sectors to enrich the 
agricultural reform components of our liberalisation scenarios, including a crop-fibre sector to 
allow us to say something about impacts on the cotton sector. Among other sectors, those 
associated with textiles, apparel and leather products are separately modelled (see Appendix 
Table 1). 
 
4.2 Scenario  Design 
 
As agreed in the Uruguay Round, the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) is to be completely 
phased out by the beginning of 2005. Although many countries are currently raising concerns 
over possible impacts, we partially anticipated this agreement in our analysis by eliminating 
the quantitative barriers to this trade before conducting further trade liberalisation scenarios. 
The GTAP database represents these quotas through a system of export taxes, which we 
reduced to zero in a prior simulation.  
 
Two trade liberalisation scenarios are employed. In each, special and differential treatment 
(SDT) is recognised through lower reductions to developing region trade barriers in some 
cases, and no liberalisation requirements for the least-developed regions of Asia and Africa. 
This is in line with Doha Ministerial Declaration (see section 2.1c) as well as the July 2004 
framework accord (see section 2.3e). A simple, single-tier approach to lowering tariff barrier 
is employed, involving cuts of 50% and 25% for developed and developing regions 
respectively. The second scenario assumes developing regions make the same reduction in 
trade barriers as do their developed counterparts, in part to illustrate any benefits to the former 
regions from deeper reductions in their own import protection. Moreover, as stated in section 
2.3(e), the Doha Ministerial declaration distinguishes the legitimate concerns of the least-
developed countries from the middle-income developing countries for SDT.  
 
Both scenarios incorporate the elimination of agricultural export subsidies, as agreed in the 
WTO July Framework Agreement. We do not apply this reform to developing countries 
however in recognition of differential treatment, and also the fact that almost all such 
subsidies are incurred by developed countries. Reductions in subsidies related to domestic 
farm support programmes are another important component of the agricultural negotiations. 
We focus only the most trade-distorting of these subsidies, namely output subsidies (e.g. price 
support programmes) and subsidies to intermediate inputs. Thus we simulate no changes to 
the levels of spending in either the blue or green boxes. These reform scenarios along with 
stipulated policy changes in all regional groupings are summarised in Table 1.  
 
12 Table 1:   Scenario Design: Percentage Shocks to Policy Variables 
 
Policy variable  Scenario #1  Scenario #2 
Tariffs
a   
Developed regions  -50  -50 
Developing regions  -25  -50 
Least developed regions  No change  No change 
Agricultural export subsidies
b   
Developed regions  -100  -100 
Developing regions  No change  No change 
Least developed regions  No change  No change 
Trade-distorting domestic subsidies
c   
Developed regions  -50  -50 
Developing regions  -25  -50 
Least developed regions  No change  No change 
 
a.  All sectors. Percentage reductions are from applied tariffs in the base year that have been converted to  
ad valorem equivalents where necessary in the GTAP database. 
b.  Applied to exports of the farm and processed food sectors only 
c.  Defined as total expenditures on output & intermediate input subsidies to farm production only. 
 
 
5.   RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
5.1  Gains from trade and domestic reforms 
 
Regional welfare gains from the two trade reform scenarios outlined in section 4.2 are 
reported in Table 2 below. Table 3 then goes on to decompose global welfare gains by type of 
reform and their origin from developed or developing regions. WTO member states are still 
negotiating on actual tariff-cutting formulas so that tariff and domestic subsidy reductions 
applied are hypothetical and taken as "reasonable" in our judgement. However, the one area 
of firm agreement in the July 2004 framework accord is elimination of all export subsidies by 
developed countries in agriculture. Accordingly, we calculate and report regional welfare 
gains from its implementation in Table 4.  Tables 5-11 then give estimates of welfare gains to 
selected regional economies, especially those located in East and Southeast Asia. These tables 
are reported at the end of this section.  Gains to these regional economies are decomposed by 
type of reform and where they are initiated in developed or developing regions. All gains are 
calculated as equivalent variation measures and measured in 2001 US dollar. 
 
13 Table 2:  Welfare Changes from Reform Scenarios (Equivalent Variation estimates 
in 2001 US$ million) 
 
Region  Reform Scenario #1 
 
Reform Scenario #2 
 
rest_NAFTA -262  -267 
USA -850  -97 
Japan 4788  6066 
China 2790  2365 
ASEAN5 2122  2994 
NEAsia 2913  4542 
LDC_Asia 429  546 
LDC_Africa -218  -182 
EFTA 3248  3371 
Rest_Eur 410  452 
CER 2092  2159 
EU_new 251  476 
Indi_SL 1222  1810 
EU 9543  11650 
Sth_America 2637  2060 
SACU 395  555 
ROW 452  1278 
Global 31963  39777 
 
Table 3:    Decomposition of Global Welfare Gains by Type of Reform in Developed 
and Developing Regions under Reform Scenario 1 & 2 (US$ million) 
 







#1 #2 #1 #2 #1  #2 
Tariff reductions: 
Agriculture 
15,282 15,290  2,373  4,610  17,655  19,900 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
2,882 2,821 1,942 3,747 4,824  6,568 
Tariff reductions: 
Manufactures 
3,078 3,065 3,068 5,584 6,146  8,649 
Export subsidy:  
Agriculture 
410 511  --    408  511 
Domestic subsidy: 
Agriculture 
727 774  -1  -1  726  773 
Total 22,379  22,261  7,382  13,940  29,759  36,401 
a   Totals do not equal those of Table 2 as reductions to services trade barriers are excluded here. 
14 Table  4:      Export subsidy: Contributions to Regional Gains in Welfare Due to 
Removal of Ag. Export Subsidy by Developed Countries   
(2001 US$ million) 
 
Region  Welfare gain: Scenario # 1 
European Union  3,348 
CER + S. America  428 
LDC Asia + LDC Africa  -308 
Other developing regions  -1,506 




5.2  Interpretation of results 
 
(a)   Scenario 1  
 
From Table 2 and Table 3, we note that about half of global welfare gain   
(US$ 15,282 mill of US$ 31,963 mill) can be attributed to agricultural tariff reductions 
in developed regions. Also two-thirds of global gain (US$ 22,379 mill of   
US$ 31,963 mill) can be obtained from all reforms in developed regions. This shows 
tariff reforms (market access) especially in agriculture should be prioritised in WTO 
negotiations. For developing countries, tariff reductions in manufacturing and TLA 
sectors contribute about 15% of the global gain in welfare. However, much of the recent 
focus in the WTO has been on export subsidies. The decision reached in the July 2004 
accord to remove agricultural export subsidies would contribute a little over 1% of the 
global welfare gain. The main beneficiary is expected to be the EU, but there is also 
some gain to CER (Australia and New Zealand) and South America owing to improved 
terms-of-trade (ToT) for their agricultural exports (Table 4). The result rationalises EU's 
support to remove all export subsidies in the framework agreement. The corollary of 
this, of course, is that the least developed food-importing regions, as well as other 
developed and developing regions experience a negative welfare impact from removal 
of agricultural export subsidies because of the adverse ToT effect on food importers. 
 
Table 2 shows that all Asian regions have welfare gain - greatest for Japan, least for 
LDC_Asia. Estimates of welfare gains to regional economies, including a break down of 
these gains from selected policy reforms under scenario 1 are reported in Tables 5-11. 
Countries located in East and Southeast Asian regions are given special attention in 
selecting reporting countries. . Main contributors for Japan's gain were agricultural and 
manufacturing tariff cuts in developed regions. For China, TLA tariff cuts in developed 
regions contributed most of her welfare gain. The results are very similar for LDC_Asia.  
NE_Asia benefits equally from developing region tariff cuts as from those in developed 
regions. India_SL benefits primarily from developing region cuts in agricultural and 
manufacturing tariffs (also reflecting this region's high tariffs in these sectors) and TLA 
tariff cuts in developed regions. ASEAN_5 gain equally from tariff cuts in both 
developed and developing regions. 
15 LDC_Africa experienced a welfare loss in this scenario, by far the major contributor 
being the developed country removal of agricultural export subsidies (Table 6). 
However cuts in developed country agricultural tariffs and support to their farmers 
(including cotton) made a positive contribution. Table 12 shows that LDC-Africa's 
cotton output rose 7.5% and her exports by 12%. In each case, one-half of the increase 
was due to the reductions in domestic support in developed regions (mainly EU and 
US). The global (import) price index for this sector increased about 3%, with two-thirds 
of that increase due to cuts in domestic farm support (Table 13). 
 
(b)   Scenario 2  
 
Under this scenario, when developing regions were assumed to make the same reduction 
(50%) in tariffs as do their developed counterparts, an extra $8 billion is added to world 
welfare gains (Table 2). Half of the additional $8 billion is gain to Asian countries, with 
the majority going to developing Asian countries. Of that $4 billion, one-half is due to 
developing countries additional cuts to manufacturing tariffs, and one-quarter to their 
additional agricultural tariff cuts. These results suggest a case could be made for special 
and differential treatment (SDT) that involves a longer phase-in period, but not lower 
tariff and subsidy reductions. 
 
With higher developing country tariff cuts, all regions gain further, except China (Table 
2). Like other developing regions, China's allocative efficiency improves primarily due 
to expansion in its TLA and electronics sectors. A difference is that terms-of-trade 
changes made positive contribution to China’s welfare gain in scenario 1, but a negative 
contribution in scenario 2. For example the world export price index for TLA rise in 
scenario 1, but actually fall in scenario 2 with the major contributor to this drop being 
the developing country tariff cuts for TLA. Domestic Chinese TLA prices rise in 
scenario 1 due to developed country tariff cuts. In scenario 2, China's TLA prices 
remain almost unchanged, as the influence of developed country tariff cuts in raising 
prices is compensated by the increased reduction in developing region tariffs on these 
goods. Thus China's TLA export prices rise much less in scenario 2 than in scenario 1.  
 
 
16 Table 5:   Decomposition of ASEAN 5 Welfare by Type of Reform in Developed and 
Developing Regions (US$ million): 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  207  200  407 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
695 -3  692 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  189  770  959 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -82  ---  -82 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  -6  2  -4 
Total 1003  969   
 
 
Table  6:    Decomposition of LDC_Africa Welfare by Type of Reform in Developed 
and Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  47  17  64 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
-21 10  -11 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  -15  -14  -29 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -264  ---  -264 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  31  4  35 
Total -222  17  --- 
 
 
Table 7:   Decomposition of Japan’s Welfare by Type of Reform in Developed and 
Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  3160  69  3229 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
-108 231 123 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  1722  635  2357 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -710  ---  -710 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  -624  -6  -630 
Total 3440  929  --- 
 
17 Table 8:   Decomposition of China’s Welfare by Type of Reform in Developed and 
Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  113  19  132 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
2320 -123  2,197 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  455  142  597 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -85  ---  -85 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  -108  -1  -109 
Total 2695  37  --- 
 
 
Table 9:   Decomposition of LDC_Asia Welfare by Type of Reform in Developed and 
Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  16  57  73 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
381 -17  364 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  -5  23  18 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -44  ---  -44 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  -28  -2  -30 
Total 320  61  --- 
 
 
Table  10:    Decomposition of Welfare Change in NE Asia by Type of Reform in 
Developed and Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  -56  679  623 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
651 322  973 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  796  516  1,312 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -171  ---  -171 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  -186  -3  -189 
Total 1034  1,514  --- 
 
18 Table 11:   Decomposition of Welfare Change in India + Sri Lanka by Type of Reform 
in Developed and Developing Regions (US$ million) 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  -19  311  292 
Tariff reductions: Textile, 
Leather & Apparel 
338 -27  311 
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  -35  343  308 
Export subsidy: Agriculture  -2  ---  -2 
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  15  19  34 
Total 297  646  --- 
 
 
Table 12:   Changes to LDC-Africa’s Cotton Economy: Scenario # 1 
 
Variable  Total change  Change due to cut in domestic 
subsidy by developed countries
Net exports  $153 mill  $71 mill 
Output 7.5%  3.3% 
Producer price  1.0%  0.7% 
Total export volume  11.7%  5.3% 
 
 
Table  13:   Change in Global Import Price Index of Crop Fibre (Cotton): 
Decomposition by Type of Reform in Developed and Developing Regions 
(percentage change) Under Scenario # 1 
 





Tariff reductions: Agriculture  0.56  -0.01   
Tariff reductions: Textile, Leather 
& Apparel 
0.07 -0.03  
Tariff reductions: Manufactures  -0.01  -0.06   
Export subsidy: Agriculture  0.29  ---   
Domestic subsidy: Agriculture  1.96  0.08   
Total     2.8 
 
 
19 6.   CONCLUSION 
 
If the Doha Round is truly to be a ‘development round’, then its agreements should reflect 
major sources of potential gain to the developing country WTO members. The G-20 group of 
developing countries continues to emphasise in Committee on Agriculture discussions that the 
real problem that needs to be addressed is trade-distorting domestic support in developed 
countries (Bridges 2004). Much negotiating and analytical effort seemingly continues to be 
aimed at the many and often complex domestic subsidy issues. For example to what extent are 
each of the myriad farm support instruments trade-distorting? How many boxes should exist, 
what might be the criteria governing box contents, and what might be the reduction 
commitments for each box? Yet previous research has indicated that such an emphasis on 
reform of domestic subsidy programmes promises relatively little gain to developing 
countries. Josling (2000) argues that developed countries may be willing to make deeper cuts 
in market access barriers if they have the leeway to compensate farmers through domestic 
programmes, and that tightening domestic support limits could therefore have a negative 
impact on agricultural trade. Hoekman et al. (2002) report that cuts to tariffs generate positive 
gains to developing countries, whereas cuts to domestic support lead to losses for such 
countries. Rae and Strutt (2003) show that improvements to market access promise the 
greatest gains to developed and developing countries and ought to be the priority issue, and 
Sumner (2000) reached a similar conclusion.  The analysis of Dimaranan et al. (2003) 
indicates that cuts in tariff barriers and related market price support plus increased use of 
decoupled direct payments (as has been occurring in the OECD region) can be a ‘win-win’ 
outcome in that farm incomes in industrial countries can be maintained at the same time as 
world price distortions are decreased and would result in welfare gains for the majority of 
developing countries.  Our own results summarised in section 5 supports this view, with our 
simulated cuts in trade-distorting domestic support in the developed countries contributing 
welfare losses in many developing and least-developed countries.  
 
The already-agreed eventual elimination of agricultural export subsidies, at least based on our 
analyses, appears to mainly benefit (for different reasons) those regions currently using such 
subsidies, and some major exporters of those products whose trade is currently distorted 
through export subsidy usage. While the latter include some developing countries (e.g. in 
South America) the aggregate impact on developing and the least-developed countries is 
negative.  
 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that market access should receive top priority in the negotiations, 
especially if the development agenda is to be successfully pursued, and that special and 
differential treatment (SDT) should be re-focussed on adjustment and assistance issues. In 
Table 14, some of our results are aggregated over all developing countries. Under either 
scenario, tariff reductions in the developed countries make the major contribution to the 
welfare gains of the developing world, and improved market access across all sectors, 
agricultural and non-agricultural, make substantial contributions to this outcome. The extent 
to which such gains will be realised is of course unknown. The July 2004 Framework 
potentially offers even greater gains in the area of agricultural market access for example, by 
expressing agreement to the principle that higher tariffs should be subject to higher cuts 
within a tiered formula. Countering this promise, however, is the prospect of countries 
20 specifying ‘sensitive products’, for which tariff cuts may be smaller provided that this is 
accompanied by some expansion in import quotas. Will developing country exporters be able 
to compete successfully for a share of such expanded access opportunities for likely sensitive 
products such as rice, dairy and sugar? What kinds of development assistance might improve 
their ability to strengthen commercial linkages to the multinational supermarket chains that 
increasingly dominate food importing and retailing? 
 
But increased access to import markets is not limited to those in industrial countries. South-
South trade is also restricted through entry barriers. Differential treatment for developing 
countries is firmly established in the Doha Round. This can be justified in terms of such 
countries abilities to deal with the adjustment issues that often accompany trade liberalisation. 
Time, and development assistance, may well be required for institution-building and 
strengthening of social support networks for example. Such differential treatment, however, 
comes at a cost in terms of foregone economic efficiency gains. Our results indicate that 
should developing countries adopt the same market access modalities as we model for the 
industrial world, then the contribution of developing region tariff reductions to their own 
welfare gain is almost the same as that which results from developed region market access 
reform. Differential treatment within our tariff reduction modality is shown to cost developing 
regions in the aggregate almost US$3.5 billion, which exceeds the cost to developed countries 
of $3 billion. The prospect of the latter gain to rich countries from the developing world’s 
acceptance of similar reduction modalities could be used in bargaining for the kinds of 
international development assistance that we eluded to in section 3 above. 
 
 
Table  14:    Welfare Gains to Developing Regions With and Without Differential 
Treatment Regarding Reduction Commitments (2001 US$ million) 
 
Policy reform  Scenario #1  Scenario #2 
In developed regions:    
Tariff reduction: agriculture  2,524  2,520 
Tariff reduction:TLA  4,329  4,264 
Tariff reduction:Manufactures  2,234  2,227 
Subtotal  9,087 9,011 
    
In developing regions:    
Tariff reduction: agriculture  1,635  3,000 
Tariff reduction:TLA  831  1,450 
Tariff reduction:Manufactures  2,069  3,461 
Subtotal  4,535 7,911 
Total over all tariff reductions  13,622 16,922 
In developed regions:    
Agricultural export & domestic subsidies  -1,723  -1,704 
    
Total welfare gain
a 12,942 16,055 
 
a   Totalled over all developing regions (see Appendix Table 2). Individual components do not add to total due 
to exclusion of service trade reforms in the above. 
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Definition of regions and sectors: 
 
Appendix Table 1:   Sectoral Aggregation 
 




Rice           Paddy rice 
grain_oilsd    Wheat, other grains, oilseeds 
hort           Fresh fruit, vegetables & nuts 
crop_fibre     Plant-based fibres (e.g. cotton) 
oth_crops      Other crops (e.g. sugar) 
animal_prod    Livestock farming 
Milk           Milk  
Other natural resource 
based: 
 
nat_res        Forestry, fishing, coal, oil & gas, other minerals 
Processed food sectors: 
 
 
meat           Red and white meats 
dairy          Dairy products 
sugar          Refined sugar 
oth_procfood   All other processed foods 
Textiles & clothing: 
 
 
textile        Textiles 
apparel        Wearing apparel 
leather        Leather products 
Other manufacturing and 
service sectors: 
 
natres_prods   Wood & paper products, petroleum, coal, chemical, 
rubber & plastic products 
metals         Ferrous metals, metal products 
transprt       Motor vehicles, transport equipment & parts 
elctronic      Electronic equipment 
oth_mnfcs      Others 
Svces          All services 
 
24 Appendix Table 2:   Regional Aggregation 
 




rest_NAFTA     Canada, Mexico 
USA            USA 
Japan          Japan 
CER          Australia, New Zealand 
EU         EU-15 
EU_new        The ten new members as of 2004 




China        Mainland China 
ASEAN5            Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore 
Indi_SL        India, Sri Lanka 
NEAsia             South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
Sth_America    Caribbean, Central & South America 
Rest_Eur  Rest of Europe including Russia 
SACU           South Africa, Botswana & rest of South African CU 
ROW            Turkey,  Morocco, & rest of Middle East & North 
Africa 
Least developed regions 
 
 
LDC_Asia       Vietnam, Bangladesh, rest of East, South & Southeast 
Asia, Pacific Islands  
LDC_Africa     Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
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